End of Term + Fall Course

Well the course is now officially at an end. Thanks to all of you, the students, for making this such a great experience for me. I appreciate your interest and your dedication to the course. We worked through some very difficult material so you ought to be as proud of yourselves as I am appreciative of your efforts.

I will be teaching another course here at UCSC this Fall. The course is 'Philosophy of Race and Gender'. We'll be covering recent essentialism versus constructivism debates now raging in contemporary discussions of race and gender. We'll also consider how different views of race and gender lend themselves to affirming the importance of a politics of recognition. We'll likely read a few very good books by Cornel West, Anthony Appiah, Judith Butler, and bell hooks. The course will start with introductory material on realism/constructivism in the work of Ian Hacking and as applied to gender and race by Sally Haslanger. Other introductory material will include the Nancy Fraser and Richard Rorty debates with which we ended PHIL/LGST 144. (Course Info: PHIL 153 - not yet added to the schedule but it will be soon - see the Philosophy Dept. course listings online).

Thanks again to all of you.

The false dichotomy between critical theory and post-structuralism can be overcome through Fraser's Pragmatic approach. She aims to examine both and separate the useful from the non-useful parts.
I think that her historical evaluation of women's past moral identity is vital in women's self-description. If one denies the creditability of past traditions one also denies the history of oppression and can therefore never successfully overcome it. Regardless of negative or positive attributes, history has to be taken as a whole. While critical theory is limited to the present, when tactfully used with a post-structuralist view of history, we can find useful the breakdown of the unjust social systems through a historical lens.

Nancy's critique on Rorty

Nancy Fraser criticizes Rorty’s claim that women should re-describe themselves using new language rather than bring up past traditions, mostly because of his view that women are rarely seen as full persons in the past. She claims that there are several past traditions that women could use to positively describe themselves. The danger of this is that not only can the positive be used but also the negative traditions. Then it becomes a matter of evaluating which characteristics carry more weight and it diminishes the argument that moral identity developed from a historical sense is useful in describing modern day women.

Fraser's Rorty

In Nancy Fraser's "Solidarity or Singularity?" she explains Richard Rorty's "Invisible Hand" and the "sublimity or decency?" concept, and I guess I'm just confused. It seems to me that Rorty contradicts himself in stating that "what promotes one will also promote the other," while also saying that pragmatism and Romanticism do not mix. Is this the evolution of his thought, or is he attempting to make a strong argument, while just confusing others? I tend to agree with the first of his arguments, that they do indeed mix. How do you feel?

Rorty: Feminism and Pragmatism

If we agree with Richard Rorty's conception of feminism, that is, that feminism and pragmatism are compatible, and the feminist project aims at simply creating a better kind of society, rather than a final step in creating a perfect society which has been ages in the making, then what does this do to the public/private distinction? Is it necessary to have separate public and private spheres in which to carry out this project, or is such a split utterly incompatible with it?

Quick thoughts on Goldman

Just some quick thoughts on Goldman, and what was discussed in class about "hitting the reset button".  After this reset button is hit, it seems to me that the new world order so to speak would naturally resemble the governments before it.  I mean, looking at it historically, peoples on the overwhelming majority have collectively, in one way or another, decided to have some sort of governing body.  This governing body ultimately has flaws, and has some people being oppressed, leading me to believe this is a natural and unavoidable byproduct of us simply being human.  

What's Young Up to Here?

So, i been thinking about Young's arguments against impartiality and i may have just been thinking about it too much, but it kinda seems like she's constructed straw man out of impartiality. She talks about impartiality as requiring that we exclude the particularities of life. Like on pg.111, "Precisely because the virtues of impartiality and universality define the civic public, that public must exclude human particularity." When i've been thinking about impartiality i've been thinking about taking all particularities into account, but ignoring one's own position in the affair. Less of a complete abstraction from life, but an abstraction from your position in it and an acknowledgment of all arguments, including your own. She talks about it denying feelings, but i always thought about it as putting your desires and feeling on equal footing with everyone else's. This is what i've been imagining Rawls is talking about with his veil of ignorance, as well. Either i'm confused about Rawls or im confused about Young or Young's confused about Rawls. Either way i could use some help sorting this out.

In response to Emma Goldman's essay, my main dispute is that it is simply incomplete as an argumentative essay. On the whole it lacks justification and she excludes voices of opposition. Furthermore she expounds on the theoretical and on that alone there is truth to what she says but she doesn't really even attempt to venture into the practical, other than to quarrel with Oscar Wilde's definition;

"...rather [it is] whether the scheme has vitality enough to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and build, as well as sustain, new life."

Not only is this unecessarily sensationalist but it fails to serve as a denotative description of what the word really means; she uses it to insinuate that 'existing conditions' are 'wrong or foolish', and that the new is the only acceptable conditions. This is logically absurd because under absolute anarchy or free communism, it would become the old at some point and become inherently 'wrong or foolish' or both. Practical is in reality a vague term that in any one person's mind is applied to something that is not overly tasking to bring about. In other words, it is both achievable and has an acceptable cost. But she wants to say that if it is something that aims to alter the existing conditions and is possible (at least theoretically) that irrespective of cost (seemingly) it is 'practical'.

Having understood her negative feelings about 'existing conditions' and utter faith in new ones, I find a contradiction in her thoughts on natural law:

"A natural law is that factor in man which asserts itself freely and spontaneously without any external force, in harmony with the requirements of nature."

and quoting Blackstone:

"Human laws are invalid, because they are contrary to the laws of nature."

She seems to be saying there is some kind of inherent truth or good or correctness in 'natural laws' which seem to be human impulses, drives, desires, etc. In other words biological forces are the only 'valid' ones, and 'external forces' are bad. But what are external forces but other humans or nature? Governments are still composed of individuals, who are driven by biological impulses. Where can she draw the line between action or thought that is the result of one's self, or society? Of course this brings up the nature/nurture debate but the question remains: how can one make a distinction between the forces of nature and the forces of the forces of nature? My main point though is to point out the lack of justification for this inherent correctness of nature and its expression in us, and our impulses. Just because unconscious forces of evolution made it, doesn't make it right. Mutations if you will, are mistakes. Most often they lead to the death of the organism or impairement, but they are absolutely necessary to survival. That means that our human form is only 'justified' temporarily, and as time changes, so must we. Change is good, but it is not true that the only good is change.

Human impulses can be incredibly destructive, the crusades as a case in point. The practice of rape and pillage in war and otherwise, greed, lust, other sins perhaps. Humans are not inherently evil, but they aren't inherently good either. We're a mix of both (if we wish to talk of good/evil).

My next question then is how do we protect ourselves from each other in a state of anarchy given these destructive qualities of humans? She seems to think they somehow disappear or are mitigated by anarchy:

"Freedom, expansion, opportunity, and, above all, peace and repose, alone can teach us the real dominant factors of human nature and all its wonderful possibilities."

She goes on to make a case that negative human behavior a result of govenments and that under the conditions of anarchy we simply won't have to worry much about them. Its interesting to note however, that she doubts our ability to confirm the inherent wickedness of human nature by not having any pure specimens to look at, and yet asserts the opposite claim (inherent goodness) in spite of the same lack of empirical data.

Without getting into the justification, I would simply assert that humans are a mix of qualities, and that they are expressed no matter what conditions they are in to varying degrees, and that we need a balance of liberty and control to maximize human growth. The question for her then is; given her strategy to protect humanity from institutions/groups, how does she plan on protecting us from individuals once they are gone?

Thoughts while reading Goldman..

Just some random thoughts I had while reading Goldman. This in particular struck a chord with me:
"The primitive man, unable to understand his being, much less the unity of all life, felt himself absolutely dependent on blind, hidden forces ever ready to mock and taunt him. Out of that attitude grew the religious concepts of man as a mere speck of dust dependent on superior powers on high, who can only be appeased by complete surrender...Man can have all the glories of the earth, but he must not become conscious of himself. The State, society, and moral laws all sing the same refrain: Man can have all the glories of the earth, but he must not become conscious of himself."

I think that society makes the individual utterly conscious of the self. It criticizes and ostracizes those who don't fall into the normal range of being. For example, children tease one another, peer pressure causes people to do things they normally wouldn't. This reminds me of the phrase "don't be so self-conscious," which does not imply that one should not be aware of one's surroundings, actions, or the actions of others -- it is to imply that the individual should not abstract an other within their own mind which holds them back. That other is often the individual's notion of what society wants. So, another way to say the same thing would be: "Don't care so much what other people think of you."

Yes, religion and society were first built upon the notion that the individual is nothing but society has progressed (a notion that Emma Goldman would appreciate) from that state to a state where individuals have the option to think freely and live as they please. This is a right which may be voluntarily given up, not an inexorable aspect of humanity.

It seems Emma Goldman was keen to highlight Anarchism's invitation to freely think, but hardly touches on the consequences when people fail to think, or worse, turn poor thoughts into action.

Emma Goldman: Quick Video History & Criticism

I searched through YouTube and found a pair of videos that go together giving some history of Emma Goldman and the anarchist movement in the United States, from her arrival in America as a teenage Russian immigrant, to her time as a villified figure in the American media after President McKinley's assassin named her as one of his inspirations, then on to her support of the Bolsheviks in the early days of the Soviet revolution and finishing with the reversal of her position of support after seeing the dark side of Lenin's new Russia.

Part 1


Part 2

Although I find Goldman's critical analysis of the oppressive factors present in religion, property and the state to be valid, I have a problem with the anarchist doctrine as a whole. What is the real plan here? Yes, we need something better than a dictatorship of the majority or of the proletariat, we need to address the inequalities and injustice that are reinforced by modern conceptions of property, and we need to be wary of metaphysical doctrines used as methods of control, but what is the plan once direct action is taken and a revolution takes place? What happens after Anarchism successfully overthrows these institutions? We need some concrete form of social organization to deal with real problems beyond the ones Anarchism identifies: problems like drought, famine, disease, wars and invasions initiated by foreign powers. How does a lawless, leaderless society deal with problems like these? I'm not saying it's impossible, but I see no clear plan for addressing these problems once Anarchism succeeds its basic goal of overthrowing these oppressive institutions.

Goldman and Anarchism

In her article, Goldman defines Anarchism to be “the philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest of violence, and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary.” She believes that Anarchism frees man from enslavement, entities that bear a horrific dominance: Religion, Property, and Government. I think her definition of Religion is focused more on the Christian basis, she makes religion sound unpleasant by generalizing in one group, but I because religion doesn’t necessarily have to dominate a person, rather it could be their lifestyle like Veganism for example; people have the freedom to follow or reject it. It seems that today, especially in America, people have the freedom to practice their “Religious” doctrines.

Government is described as an unjust, slave-driving “machine,” an uncaring robber. How would this be harmful for a contactualist society, if everyone agrees to the rules?

Observing human nature is analogous to animals in captivity because both undertake suffering in cages, unable to act upon their full potential. It seems that Goldman sees people as good in themselves, that things will become orderly by themselves. By resisting and defying “all laws and restrictions, economic, social, and moral,” I can’t imagine there being order because people will always disagree amongst each other publicly and privately.

“A perfect personality is only possible in a state of society where a man is free to choose the mode of work, conditions of work, and the freedom to work,” but if that is the case, everyone will want to be a firefighter or something glamorous. No one will want to be a janitor, or a doctor who gets paid the same amount as the janitor.

Revolution and Reaction: Differences between Marxism and Anarchism

While using very persuasive language, referencing nearly all major thinkers in anarchist thought, and touching a chord with the deep discontent many feel when looking around at society today, a careful and well informed reading of Goldman will bring up several questions. The first of which is the nature of the state and the ruling class. Engels has perhaps the best analysis of the difference between Marxists and Anarchists in his piece Versus the Anarchists. In it Engels elucidates the different perspectives of the chief problem in society; the state for the Anarchists, and the ruling class for Marxists. The basic argument is that Anarchists see the ruling class as a product, or at least dependent on the state, and therefore the state should be the main focus, as it is the main problem. Marxists, however, see the state as a tool and product of the ruling class, which is provided to help that class maintain its privileges. This is an insightful distinction, and could possibly help explain the different historical failures of both Marxism and Anarchism.

This is the first issue to take up with Goldman's essay: the state is given to much focus, and the ruling class ignored. The references she makes to trade union organizing and direct action are also dated, as they all fail within ten years. Kropotkin, Tolstoy, and Bakunin are all quintessential Anarchist theorists, however they also have relatively counterrevolutionary histories. Bakunin and Kropotkin were both Russian royalty who stood in opposition to Marxists in the First International and the Russian Civil War. While Bakunin was involved in several abortive revolutions, Kropotkin went so far as to support the Whites in the Russian Civil War. Tolstoy was an aristocratic novelist and devout Christian. The historical failures of Anarchism could perhaps be chalked up to its failure to consider the issue of the ruling class. The Krondstat Mutiny, the Spanish Civil War, and general strikes in Italy, Spain, and France show the willingness of Anarchists to cooperate with the ruling class. However Marxism seems to have erred on the side of focussing too much on the ruling class and neglecting the issue of the state. A quick survey of Stalin and Mao show the potential faults in Marxism, where once the former ruling class has been expropriated, there is no real consideration of the potential dangers of the state.

Well, after a long development I suppose that my point is this: which theory, Marxism or Anarchism, is better at explaining the main problem with society? Do modern problems and alienation stem from the state or the ruling class? Moreover, to what extent can one explain the historical shortcomings of these ideologies through understanding this difference?

Goldman and the Founding Fathers

Goldman brings up an interesting point about how the founders of the United States were spirited individuals with minds to create change. “If not for the spirit of rebellion, of the defiance on the part of the American revolutionary fathers, their posterity would still wear the King’s coat.” I wonder what the founding fathers of the United States would say about the way American citizens have allowed the Bush administration to engage in a war that is not widely supported by its citizens. Sometimes I think that if the founders were here today they would be appalled by how much authority the American people have given to their government. I think if they were here, they might be inspired to rebel against the current political institutions in the United States in an attempt to create a government where, once again, the goal would be to serve and protect it’s citizens instead of exploiting them as pawns to make corporations vast amounts of profit.

Root of all Evil?

Goldman is suggesting that government, religion, and property is what causes all of our problems, and we need to do away with all of this so that human beings can finally be free to develop in healthy and life-affirming ways. And though her indictment of much of the injustices in modern society are valid, I am not convinced that it is the "government, religion, and property" as such that are responsible for all our woes. Obviously this is an immensely complex issue, but it strikes me that there is something more at the root of our problem than the things that Goldman is addressing. Yes government, religion, and private property can be used to perpetrate evil, but are these things really evil in themselves? It seems to me that Goldman is possibly ignoring the individual responsibility that each one of us has to "do justice and love mercy". Blaming all the problems on human institutions seems to beg the question.

Another question: how can Goldman so confidently assert that religion is just a total sham to keep us from "discovering our humanity"? Perhaps she is right, but why is it that the majority of people throughout all ages, and continuing on today, have a sense that there is more to this universe than the merely material? It strikes me as somewhat presumptive to simply deny the possibility of the spiritual realm simply because she thinks it has been used for evil purposes. I say this because even she herself seems to suggest that anarchism has some Ultimate Value: " It is the great, surging, living truth that is reconstructing the world, and that will usher in the Dawn."

Thoughts Anyone?

Lecture Notes: Foucault and Young

The slides from the Michel Foucault and Iris Young lectures are now online. Hope they are helpful to some of you in revisiting your lecture notes.

Michel Foucault Lectures
May 6: Foucault Intro
Teaching_Phil144_May6_Foucault_Intro.pps

May 8: Foucault's Discipline and Punish (Disciplining Power & Liberating Freedom)
Teaching_Phil144_May8_Foucault_DP.pps

May 13: Foucault's Discipline and Punish (Power/Knowledge, Normalization)
Teaching_Phil144_May13_Foucault_DP.pps

May 15: Foucault's Discipline and Punish (Panopticism, Diffusing Discipline)
Teaching_Phil144_May15_Foucault_Disc.pps

Iris Young Lectures
May 20: Iris Marion Young (Justice plus Politics of Difference)
Teaching_Phil144_May20_Young.pps

May 22: Iris Marion Young (Feminism, Oppression and Domination as Injustices)
Teaching_Phil144_May22_Young.pps

May 27: Iris Marion Young (Public and Private)
Teaching_Phil144_May27_Young_PubPriv.pps

Let me know if you have any difficulties with the files or links...

Class Note: 1-Pager Due Thursday

Please bring to class this Thursday a short one-page response paper. The paper should be one-page max., double-spaced or 1.5-spacing, typed and with your name at the top top.

The topic of the paper should be just one of the critics of liberalism we have been reading over the last few weeks. So, either a page on Foucault or Young (or Goldman or Marx) will do. Describe one of their criticisms of liberalism (or one aspect of liberalism) and briefly suggest why you agree or disagree.

You might use this as an opportunity to think about integrating Foucault or Young (or Goldman or Marx) into the final research essay which you should be thinking about and/or working on by now. As a reminder, the final research essay of 7-9 pages will be due in class (and by email) next Thursday.

Positivist Grounds?

By arguing for the establishment of some global governing body, doesn't Young fall victim to her own criticism of our moral responsibilities to one another being based purely around a positivist outlook, thus actually "robbing" the responsibilities of any actual moral application, and designating them purely as a matter of obligatory policy to the governing body's regulation of all who exist within it?

Two Questions

1. Young seems to be aiming for a society of difference without hierarchy, in as much as hierarchy would entail difference as being a basis for exclusion. Are all kinds of difference amenable to this system? Are there certain kinds of difference that we might want to a priori exclude from the liberal state? How might a just politics of difference pragmatically relate to things like religious fundamentalism (Islamic or Christian), or issues given strong moral weight as regards life like abortion or animal rights. What is the extent of liberal toleration?

2. Does Young's critique, by focusing on an emancipatory interest juxtaposed against an oppressive one, recapitulate sovereign power? Does conceiving of power relations as disciplinary power simply entail an acknowledgment that the exercise of power is diffuse and no longer connected to a unary, directly blamable body, so that emancipation must take on structures and relations rather than individuals, or might Young need to better account for the productive and complicit ways in which we partake in disciplinary power?

The Universal Citizen

In class we talked about Young's criticism of the Public/Private divide, which pointed out that power structures of the Public Sphere reach into the Private Sphere and condition the possibilities of individuals within family structures and are generally internalized into the Private Sphere. On page 110, she talks about the notion of a model of knowledge and social discourse that legitimizes the power of certain groups through the exclusion of others (pg 111, last full paragraph). To what degree do these power relations become internalized within the behaviors of individuals, such that people of excluded groups believe and participate in the discourse which excludes them? Going back to Foucault, how does his notion of power relate to Young's criticisms? Is her model still too dualistic?

The Ideal of Impartiality

In the beginning of chapter four Young argues for the 'ideal of impartiality', a feminist argument that challenges the modern conception of moral reasoning. The ideal of impartiality is very similar to Rawls's original position. "The stances of detachment and dispassion that supposedly produce impartiality are attained only by abstracting from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view"(Young, 97). I agree with the idea of making laws/rights under the conditions Young and Rawls speak of. Does anyone disagree with this ideal? Why?

The Proper Distribution of Goods

America is a society with a vast array of material goods and also extreme differences in the access to those goods this directly relates to John Rawls theory of justice based on the distribution of goods, which is also important for Iris Marion Young. However, Young defines social justice in an expansion of Rawls’ distributive justice and in relation to her idea of the distributive paradigm as “the morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members… [and] often includes, however, non-material social goods such as rights, opportunity, power, and self-respect” (16). The distributive paradigm is Young’s critique on theorists like Rawls' conception of justice based on distribution that does not take individuality into account and simplifies people in relation to the goods that they possess rather than their personal history or current situations. She suggests that people in the distributive paradigm are just “nodes, points in the field” which becomes illogical when expanded to non-material resources (18). It is obvious to me that things such as rights or opportunity are not equal for everyone in our society, do you agree? If so, how do you think our society or any society could go about equally distributing both material and non-material goods in a more effective manner?

Foucault and Young

Foucault in Discipline and Punish describes a world which is dominated by a system of discipline. He asserts that modern society individuates people on the bodily level and as a result categorize them according to their tasks, for training, observation, and control. How do you think that Marion Iris Young would respond to this? Would she agree with Foucault about the idea that oppression and control are inherently built within the system or would she argue that oppression and control are merely a product of a faulty system?

Young and Liberalism

In chapter 2, Young states "We cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions." (41)

In liberal society there is oppression, but is it just an unfortunate by-product of liberalism or is it a sort of necessary evil? Even with the progress that the new social movements have made, will there always be some degree of oppression? Young goes on to say that oppression affects groups, but liberalism is focused on individuals. Do all individuals benefit from living in a liberal society? If not, who does liberalism benefit? Is it necessary to have a sort of balance of power through oppression for liberalism to work in the real world?

Note for Thursday's Class

All excellent questions/comments on Iris Young (et. al.) so far this week. Great job.

A note for Thursday's class: bring a copy of your first paper or an outline of your final paper (or something of that sort). For the second half of the session on Thursday we are going to split into small groups based on the topic of your final paper (email me if you want a topic change from your first paper) and you will share your paper topic with others in your group in order to solicit feedback, to exchange notes on secondary readings, and to get your ideas into gear by discussing them with others. Try to work up a short one or two sentence thesis statement which you can quickly offer to those in your group as a summary of your project.

Rawls, Young, Feminists, Future

After learning about Rawls' original position: individuals putting aside their own principles under a "veil of ignorance," how do you think Iris Marion Young would view this theory of Rawls? How might Rawls respond back? I believe that what Young is saying is that society needs to look at what is the most important to us and work together to change things. Society must debate collectively and progressively. Why spend time worrying about social ethics when we can work together to change things. For example, take the education system or health care. If society is so caught up in the importance of these systems, why shouldn't the education system get more funding? How about paying teachers or physicians a higher salary? In addition, I think Young also looks at the important of the role of women the in the world of politic and culture. This leads me to wonder how feminists, such as Young, has changed the philosophy of politics and how feminists might continue to change this philosophy for the future. How do you think Young has changed the philosophy of politics in the past? How might her work change things for the future?

The Distributive Paradigm and Econ

Can distributive paradigm relate to Rawl's reflective equilibrium? Young quotes Rawls extensively, and focuses on the dominance of the upper social elite class. There is a scenario of monopoly, if I have a taco stand and I sell my tacos at two dollars a piece. Another person comes along and also starts a taco stand business, but he sells his tacos at one dollar each. In order for me to stay in business, I play the game of how low can one go, as we switch off lowering our prices until one of us hits equilibrium. If a 3^rd party monopoly decides to come in and buy out our supplies to make tacos, then the prices for equilibrium would change. Should 3^rd party monopoly or private corporate decision makers have the power to change the economy? Young states, “Class domination is certainly enacted by agents deciding where to invest their capital- a distributive decision; but the social rules, rights, procedures and influence that structure capitalist decision-making are not distributed goods” (21). She wants to distinguish the idea of class and mode of production…

“Economic domination derives at least as much from the corporate and legal structures and procedures that give some persons the power to make decisions about investment, production, marketing, employment, interest rates, and wages that affect millions of other people” (23). Back to the scenario, if the governments distribute wealth equally, would it solve the problem of monopoly? Would other issues emerge? Young states, “Public discussions of social injustice tend to revolve around inequalities of wealth and income,, and the extent to which the state can or should mitigate the suffering of the poor” (19).

The Philosopher vs. The Economist

We started off this course with authors such as Mills and Rawls, who debated the abstract theories of Justice. These philosophical debates of justice such as if the first world countries are obligated to aid third world countries are fascinating as well as important. Young, on the other hand, realizes the importance of looking beyond these abstract theories. If it is agreed that we should aid the third world countries, the equally important and complex debate stems of how we should help them. As a Business Management Economics major my mind often drifts towards imagining new strategies on what would be the most efficient way in which we could do this. As a business has many different departments, there are many different aspects of this goal that require innovative and thorough plans. For example, marketing – how can we get the people of the first world to want to help the people of the third world? Perhaps if we try to better relate the individual people and families in the first world to the individual people and families of the third world. Of course another main focus, which Young discusses, is distribution. I’m not sure if I completely agree with his idea that we should only seek to equally distribute material goods. As an economist, I think the distribution plans should focus on what is the most efficient way we can stimulate their economy so that they will be able to increase their own revenue and GDP. Self-respect, opportunity, power, and honor are issues Young argues distribution should not cover, but distribution of opportunity through distribution of resources such as education (which is not material) should, in my mind, be the key focus.

Self-Respect

On page 27, Iris Marion Young says that, "Self-respect names not some possession or attribute a person has, but her or his attitude toward her or his entire situation and life prospects." She goes on, "People have or lack self-respect because of how they define themselves and how others regard them, because of how they spend their time, because of the amount of autonomy and decisionmaking power they have in their activities, and so on." Young argues that distributive theories have shortcomings when it comes to nonmaterial goods (such as self respect) because "the distributive paradigm tends to conceive of individuals as social atoms, logically prior to social relations and institutions...such an atomistic conception of the individual as a substance to which attributes adhere fails to appreciate that individual identities and capacities are in many respects themselves the products of social processes and relations. Societies do not simply distribute goods to persons who are what they are apart from society, but rather constitute individuals in their identities and capacities." I see what she is getting at, in that how you regard yourself is influenced by how others regard you but I think she is putting too much emphasis on public influence. There is a difference between the private self and the public self; I feel like Young does not thoroughly separate the two. Personally, I feel like there is more to people than what the public expects from them and it seems like Young is saying that people come to be what society expects them to be. In the nature vs. nurture debate, I feel like Young is too far on the nurture side and while I don't 100% disagree, I do think there is more of a balance between the two, and if either side dominates, I think it would be the nature side. Again, I do agree that society has a major influence on individuals' actions but I think people have a private self that knows better, so to speak. For instance, a man in prison can have self respect without having the respect of the public, especially if he knows he is innocent. What do you guys think?

South Park, Britney Spears, and Foucault

When I was watching the new episode of South Park last night it made me think about discipline and punishment. The episode is about how the media, the tabloids, and in general the paparazzi harass Britney Spears and document and intensively monitor her every movement, especially the more embarrassing, less flattering ones, and how the general public is completely engrossed and fascinated by all this information, and in particular the information that documents her self-destruction. Towards the end of the episode the parents of Kyle and Stan inform the kids that the whole society is part of this cruel torture, from the paparazzi to the media consumers, and announce that "Britney Must Die" and explain that killing celebrities through the media and harrassment is the modern form of torture and human sacrifice. The basic premise is that someone special is choosen and admired and then torn apart and killed for sacrificial reasons (in the episode's case, to enhance the coming year's corn crop), similar to older rituals of human sacrifice. This made me think about the changing form of torture and how perhaps the means may have changed but the ends are the same. A great deal of people still take pleasure in other's pain and misery, but now the form of it makes it more bearable and less explicitely cruel, like the punishment of prisoners. Does anyone else have thoughts about this or other examples of how torture has changed?

Burma

This is kind of an abstract post but I wanted to bring this question about the legitimacy of the state in terms of style of sovereign or disciplinary forms of rule into a more contemporary context. Foucault seems to keep juxtaposing between two hundred years of history as if everything had been turned on its head and no vestiages of the old forms of rule still existed when in fact throughout much of the world, the rule of the sovereign remains claiming authority in the divine. Foucault seems to suggest that these two forms of rule, while inherently different, seem to not change the amount of freedom we have but the cooperation of this freedom with the state. What then would be an analysis of the type of repression the people face in Burma verses the repression we face here?

The Origin of Discipline

I have a question that may betray my lack of understanding of Foucault, but here it is: he seems to be saying that the discipline that began to be imposed in prisons in the 1800s has caused us who are not incarcerated to also discipline ourselves in similar ways, and that this is "dangerous".  My question is haven't we always had to discipline ourselves to do what we know to be beneficial, even when we don't want to do it?  I am thinking of trivial things like brushing one's teeth or cleaning one's house.  It could also include for many of us doing our jobs even though we don't enjoy them.  My point is that the need for self-discipline seems to have been with us for a long time.  Is Foucault saying that we have simply become more conscious of it, or perhaps that we are disciplining ourselves in areas where it's not even necessary (e.g. the intro scene in American Psycho), or what?  

In my reading of him I always get this ominous feeling like some terrible transition has occurred where we all now police ourselves somewhat unconsciously and that in the past the policing came from external sources.  I guess I am just unsure about how much this has really changed or in what ways this has changed, and furthermore what I am supposed to make of it.  Is Foucault merely documenting the change or does he want to incite some kind of feeling in us and possibly move us toward action?  I am a bit perplexed.

"Why you buggin' about being monitored if you ain't doin' nothin' wrong?"

The Patriot Act, which resembles the idea of the Panopticon in its pervasive monitoring, came to my mind while reading Foucault. Among most of the people that I know, the reaction to the Patriot Act has been negative—it is seen by many as a threat to privacy and liberty. While I am personally not comfortable with the idea of being monitored, I can understand fairly clearly the argument for a constant monitoring, namely that it is a powerful tool in preventing unwanted activities (specifically coordinated terrorist activities in the case of the Patriot Act). It does, however, clash with the idea that the State should remain out of my hair unless I do something to harm someone else. As far as I understand, though, two arguments of those in favor of constant monitoring would be that 1.) Why wait until after the harm is done? Should we not try to prevent harm? And 2.) If it is known that we might be monitored at any given time, we may be deterred from doing what we think might get us in trouble.

Number 2 is straightforward enough, even if it results in a general unpleasant residue of worrying over whether my behavior and actions are appropriate. Number 1 is tricky, because it’s unclear how successfully harm is prevented when someone is arrested for something that they did not yet do. While reading Foucault, I also thought of the movie Minority Report (I haven’t read the book), wherein people are arrested, shaved, and stored in tubes for the rest of their lives BEFORE they commit any crime. In the movie, the murder rate drops to zero, which is a pretty clear indication that their methods worked. There was the implication that some people were put away even though they were not going to actually kill anyone, but that was not very bothersome, as the number of people saved from being murdered was higher than those unfairly put away in a tube forever. Now, this “Pre-Crime” system happened to be able to utilize supernatural siblings that could see into the future. That’s something that we are lacking (for now).

Foucault writes of the various failures of the prison system in the 19th century, which, as far as I can tell, are still problems today. The main point seemed to be that, as the prison was an area for desperate, angry “delinquents” to congregate, and since the lives of these delinquents were made very difficult after release from prison (e.g., not being able to get a job due to ex-con status), the whole prison system seemed to breed more crime. The implication is that this kind of prison system makes enemies, and so the vicious cycle of recidivism grabs hold.

So then perhaps classical Liberalism puts the people in too much danger as they sit and wait for harm to be done to them before the criminal can be dealt with. Perhaps the State should be involved at all times, constantly monitoring or being thought to be constantly present so that we, the people, mind ourselves better. Perhaps people who are brought to prison should be treated more nicely, educated, and helped back onto their feet while being constantly monitored so that they don’t wind up back in prison.

My stance is a resounding I Don’t Know. I don’t see very much public or government interest in the matter regarding prisons, beyond the comment that the prisons are getting very full. I did appreciate Foucault’s attempt to grasp the complexity of the matter, though I myself don’t feel that I have enough of a grasp of how and why people today end up in prison to gauge how fully he grasps the matter.

Panopticon

Foucault suggests that the most effective prison would be one of a Panopticon. He proposes its design would lead the prisoners to keep themselves in line. That after they had been caught red handed a few times, the prisoners would assume that they will be caught every time
and thus would stay out of trouble on their own. There would not even be a need to monitor all the prisoners at any given time as long as they believed they were being constantly watched. Since his proposal, only three panopticon prisons have been constructed. It seems that in practice, although the prisoners stayed in line, they enjoyed their stay a little too much compared to normal conceptions of prison stays. They found they had more freedom than in a normal prison. My question is whether this is a bonus of a panopticon prison or a defect. There are innocent people in prison, but do we want the guilty ones to look forward to their stay at all?

The Life of the Panopticon

Foucault argues that the invention of the Panopticon brought into being a whole new type of society, a transition from a society of spectacle to one of surveillance. We now live in the "panoptic mahine" by which we are disciplined and by which we discipline others. In reading about the Panopticon I am often struck by fear of this impersonal "all-seeing eye", yet I remember that the Panopticon is not to be controlled by any one individual, but is supposed to be open to the public: "any member of society will have the right to come and see with his own eyes how the schools, hospitals, factories, prisons function" (p.207). There is admittedly something terrifying about the feeling that one is always being watched, but does the fact that surviellance is regulated/monitored by the public serve to alleviate some of these fears, or is it perhaps even more troubling to think that we are all engaged in policing one another?

foolish question...

This question may appear foolish, and I may be misinterpreting the reading but in going over the text, the section on the formation of the disciplinary society, (218-228) I Noticed that in the second formation, through the juridico-political structures, the disciplinary panoptic modality of power, though it seems to rely on the juridial structure of society, nonetheless appears to be undermining the basic juridical structure. Through the panoptic disciplinary structure's instantiation into social networks and institutions, they become what Foucault referred to as a "sort of counter-law" that suspends the actual laws of the juridico-political structure. How then can this panoptic modality be a form of support for the juridical structure if it is in some ways undermining its authority and maintaining it's own semi-independent existence?

Panoptical Society

Foucault promotes the discipline-mechanism – like the panoptical society – image of discipline, where discipline tries to "improve the exercise of power" by making it cheaper and more productive over the discipline-blockade that encloses and keeps everything out. In what way would a panoptical society be most efficient? Would you have different institutions working towards individual goals and observe each under a hierarchal system? Would you need specialists to observe specific institutions and how could you be sure that they are effectively observed? How would these different institutions be able to effectively share information? Can order be easily maintained by such small enforcement?

Normailization

Foucault talks about the penal punishment system working to normalize the prisons. He says they are "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes."(183) Foucault really stresses the moral education aspect of penal punishment that has faded into the background in recent times. Professor Jerome Neu offered a reason for this being that it disrespects the agency of the actor. That to assume the person committing a crime needs moral education is to assume he is not acting rationally. But is a society wrong to demand actors living within it must not only act rationally but reasonably (in a Rawlsian sense)? Is it not the case that an actor has shown some inability to act reasonably when they broke the laws of the land instead of finding a way to accomplish their goals through social co-operation? Cases of civil disobedience would have to be handled differently, but is their not some cause to say that Foucault's Normalizing effect is a good thing, and the proper goal of punishment to re-integrate the criminal into society? Not to say Foucault comes out on either side, but after everything he's said about the contingency it of happening in just this way, do you think that normalization is the proper goal of punishment?

The rule of common truth

Foucault discusses the notion of power operating under certain rules involving the types of knowledge-claims it makes. "The verification of the crime must obey the general criteria for all truth. In the arguments it employs, in the proofs it provides, legal judgment must be homogeneous with power in general." (p.97) What sorts of mechanisms does this "rule of common truth" take on in order to both reveal and obscure knowledge about the crime, the criminal, and the punishing power? How did the rise of Enlightenment thinking affect the establishment of this sort of notion of legislative truth? How are knowledge-claims about law and punishment (both transparent and concealed) justified in the modern legal and political world? Are they transparent? Do they in fact follow the same rules of evidence and proof available to common reason?

Private Space: Freedom or Discipline?

My view before reading Foucault was that individuals have the right to have private space in society (such as their homes) in which they are free from interference from the public sphere. However, on p.143 Foucault states that the "principle of enclosure" works to "establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits." After reading this passage I realized that the idea of dividing people up into enclosed places is a way of maintaining discipline in society and it allows the public sphere to supervise and regulate individuals more effectively and efficiently. To what extent do you think that we discipline ourselves and maintain the public sphere's control over us by upholding this ideal of private, individual space? Is there anyway to avoid this? Is this even a bad thing?

Chomsky vs. Foucault

Here's a 12 minute clip of a debate between Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky from 1971.

< link >

I thought it would be relevant to the class just to show Foucault and Chomsky arguing about a possible future just society, and their differences in methodology for bringing it about. Chomsky in a sense represents a Rawlsian approach in the formulation of an ideal theory for a just society based on an idealized notion of human nature as it should be, and presents his own version of a system that encourages the growth and flourishing of a fundamentally creative human nature (anarcho-syndicalism being his ideal candidate). Foucault, on the other hand, pushes for the genealogical approach of critiquing and attacking current seemingly neutral institutions and power-relations to bring methods of oppression, coercion, and "political violence" into view, so that they may be challenged and fought against.

There's also a transcript of the full debate available here.

Torture in the Public Spectacle

In Michael Foucault's book Discipline and Punish, Foucault states that Torture has disappeared from public viewing over the past few hundred years. "Among many changes, I shall consider one: the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle"(Foucault, 7). As United States Citizen's, we have the eighth amendment to protect us against cruel and unusual punishments. Present day society has moved far away from the days of torture. Torture is such a far fetched idea to humans that we will pay money to walk around a torture museum.
How has this extreme shift in penal procedure occured in such a short time? What major events come to mind that would spark such a shift? What about the ideas of torture is so extreme compared to our present system?

Outline of Foucault's 'D and P'

An Outline of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish:
For Students and First-Time Readers

Colin Koopman, UC Santa Cruz

In the following analytical summary of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish the Roman numerals refer to Parts of books text (as divided in the English edition) and the Arabic numerals refer to subdivisions in the different parts (of the same edition). Parenthetical numbers refer to page numbers. For example, II.1 (78-82) refers to Part II, section 1, pages 78-82.

Three Stages of Power (cf. pp.115, 131, 236, 264, 307)

1. Monarchial power and punishment as torture (I.2), 18^th century
2. Reformative punitive semio-technique (II.1), late 18^th c. to early 19^th c.
3. Discipline and surveillance; punishment as prison (III/IV), 19^th c. to 20^th c.

Contents of Discipline and Punish

I.1
End of Torture (8-14)
Scientifico-Juridical Complex (19-23)
Intention of the book (23)
Four General Methodological Rules (23)
Body & Soul (25-31)

I.2
Torture and Supplice defined (33-5)
Truth via inquisition and confession of body (35-47)
Torture as ritual (47-54)
Torture reveals a particular regime of truth and power (54-7)
Dual role of the people (57-65)

II.1
Humanitarian Reformers (74ff.)
New Theory of Power (78-82)
Contractarian Parallels (89-92)
Utilitarian Parallels, prevention (92-101)
Objects of this regime of truth and power (101-3)

II.2
Conditions of semio-punishment (104-114)
A new theory of punishment, from semio- to prison (114ff.)
Two problems facing imprisonment (117-120)
Stating the explanatory problem of new power (120-31)

III.1
Disciplines in 18^th century (137-41)
Analytic of space (141-9), of acts (149-56), of time (156-62), of efficiency (162-9)

III.2
Observation (170-7)
Normalization (177-84)
Examination (184-92)
Disciplinary power: social and individual (192-4)

III.3
Confinement and Discipline (195-200)
Panopticon (200-9)
Spread of Discipline (209-17)
Cultural context: economy, law, science (217-228)

IV.1
Prison technology (231-5)
Isolation, vocation, modulation (235-48)
Delinquents (249-55)

IV.2
From chain gain to police wagon (257-64)
Critique of the prison (265-8)
Seven maxims of prison technique (269-70)
Failure of the prisons (271-8)
Advantages and motivations of delinquency (278-85)

IV.3
Spread of punishment throughout society/culture (296-8)
Results of diffusion of punitive discipline (298ff.)

Foucault

Foucault's history of the prison system is quite intense. From his first examples of horrendous torture, to his explanation of the modern judicial systems, the tone of disgust, and lack of humanity is quite evident, as he explains the change is judicial theory and practice in a democratic society. At first the perpetrator Damien, is cruelly dissected and destroyed as a mass spectacle in the towns square. This is justice as of two hundred plus years ago. The trend quickly transforms, and the executions are held behind closed doors, away from the public, as a way to condemn those guilty of capital punishment. Now as he explains, the prison system focuses directly on the transformation of the soul of the condemnable with a form of systematic slavery . Not only has the prison system transformed its process of attacking the body to maintain justice by attacking the soul, moreover there has been a change in the idea of knowledge and what is truth when investigating offenses. What used to be a simple three step process, "Knowledge of the offense, knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law" (Foucault 19), is now an examination process where authorities pass the power to judge to any and all other institutions as an attempt to reform.

The Implications

Going beyond the reading, how do other disciplinary practices and discourses beside forms of punishment contribute to individuals self-disciplining themselves in particular ways and what are the consequences? 

Consider the medicalization of certain behaviors, or cultural taboos that construct certain sexual behaviors as perverse, or processes of gender, racial, or cultural identity formation. Processes of normalization found throughout cultures and societies limit possibilities of action, restrain opportunities, and often times succeed through subversive, subtle, and inconspicuous means. 

So, is it fair to think of culture and society as a prison system, as a network of power relations that normalize individuals to make them more efficient, manageable, and "healthy", and individuals as prisoners who are both affected by the system and self-willing the imprisonment to benefit from better treatment by the society/culture?

"Don't touch my body" Foucault contra Carey

Two ideas strike me as foundational to Foucault's introduction to this text: the idea of the condemned as the kings shadow and the idea of the soul as a duplication of the body put into effect by strategies of power, both on page 29. We can understand (and Foucault says as much when he calls his undertaking a "genealogy of the modern soul") that what is being attempted is an attempt to shed light on our modern souls by analyzing the historical conditions of discipline and punishment. In juxtaposing the images of torture and the modern prison (the art and the economy, to paraphrase), Foucault wants us to begin thinking about this inward movement that he is attempting to track. My question in all this is: If he is going to connect this to the modern liberal state (which he will), I will be very interested to see how he explains what sort of motivating forces necessitate this duplicating move.

Foucault 2: The Revenge

Foucault discusses what he means by the "soul" (p.29-30) and how it is the subject of punishment aimed at under modern legal systems. He states that this soul is not the soul born to us under the model of the monotheistic "big three", and that instead it is a soul created by the structures of punishment, supervision, and subjection. What, then, is this "soul"? How can structures of power give rise to such a thing as a soul? If the soul is the subject, does this then imply that our sense of being subjects and what it means to have subjectivity has been constructed by structures that are essentially external to what we perceive as our "selves"? Through reference to what structures and through what material objects in the world does this "soul" come into existence?

Foucault

Michel Foucault claims that the aim of punishment has shifted from the body to the soul. Since the end of the use of torture, punishment has become less and less of a public spectacle. It seems that punishment is becoming more removed from the public eye, and more of a 'behind-closed-doors' phenomenon - ie, it is attempting to move into the private sphere, working on the soul, the private aspect of the individual, versus the body, the aspect susceptible to public scrutiny. In terms of rehabilitation and punishment, is it more effective to work on the individual via the soul through the prison system - the disciplined routines, the limited liberties, the constant observation - or the body through torture?

Hayek and Connectionism

Hayek proposed that the free price system was an instance of spontaneous order, "which is the result of human action but not of human design." Interestingly, in The Sensory Order, he proposes connectionism as the basis of such behavior. Connectionism is the view that mental and subsequently behavioral phenomena are emergent properties which arise from the interaction of simple units, i.e. neurons. I'll admit I've only just started to research this, but it seems that the inference is that spontaneous order in economics is a reflection of similar spontaneous order within the brain itself.

Does this seem plausible? Can such events taking place on the micro level be reflected at the macro level? Is this theory reductionist? Would that be a bad thing?

Julie Lange

Course Lectures: Mill and Rawls Slides

Below are links to slideshows for the Mill and Rawls lectures from the first part of the course. I hope some of you will find them useful in preparing your papers. As always, email me with any questions.

Teaching_Phil144_Apr3_PolPhil_Intro.pps (Introduction to Political Philosophy)

Teaching_Phil144_Apr3_Mill_Intro.pps (Introduction to Mill)

Teaching_Phil144_Apr8_Mill_PubPriv.pps (Public/Private in Mill)

Teaching_Phil144_History_Privacy_Law.ppt (History of Privacy Law)

Teaching_Phil144_Apr10_Rawls_BasicCo.pps (Rawls Basic Concepts 1)

Teaching_Phil144_Apr15_Rawls_BasicCo.pps (Rawls Basic Concepts 2)

Teaching_Phil144_Apr15_Rawls_TwoPrin.pps (Rawls' Two Principles of Justice)

Teaching_Phil144_Rawls_PubPriv.pps (Public/Private in Rawls)

All files listed above are at 'http://cwkoopman.googlepages.com/'.

In his "The Use of Knowledge in Society" article, Hayek asserts that "economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision" (H12). In order to address the inevitable changes Hayek argues in favor of his decentralized price system. It does not address the fact that our system is not reducing inequality as it is supposed to and that it might need to be changed. I wonder if a decentralized system impedes the evolution of our overarching economic system into a more equitable one by dividing up too much power between people who are self-interested (within capitalist society). 

Hayek calls for decentralization of economics. Would he want to get rid of the Federal Reserve Bank? It doesn't regulate prices between commodities, but the value of money in general. What about international trade and tariffs, minimum wage, and corporations being required to supply health insurance, retirement plans, and pensions? Would he be against insider trading on the stock market? That is an example where we, as a society, commonly agree that having and using privileged knowledge is unethical. I wonder to what extent he wants to take the price system he's proposing.

Does the price communicate all that Hayek says it does?

Hayek asserts that the "price system"(H.20) clearly communicates everything that the particular purchaser needs to know. That their "limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap"(H.21) to create the best of all possible worlds. In the tin example,(H.21) it seems like there is more information that a purchaser could want, beyond that the price had gone up or down. For instance, if an oil company were to raise prices at the same time as a major conflict in the Middle-East begins, people may assume that this is because they are having difficulty procuring oil, thus creating a scarcity. But if the company knows that people will expect this, they could raise the price regardless of difficulties in accumulation. This is a politically charged example, but the point is a simple one. There may be more information necessary than can be summed up in a price index. Hayek claims that "There is no need for the great majority of them(purchasers) even to know where the more urgent need has arisen."(H.21) Should there not be someone watching to legitimize claims of scarcity? All questions of feasibility aside, couldn't we use a system of checks and balances to our economic structure?

Hayek on The Use of Knowledge in Society

How should we ideally construct a good economy? According to F.A. Hayek, "If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out from a given system of preferences, and if we command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic". Unfortunately, he claims, this is really not possible in reality. Hayek's argument is that centralized knowledge and control of goods and resources based on theoretical models will not be as successful as a decentralized system that operates according to the price mechanism. He gives the example of a shortage of tin due to some unknown cause and shows how there is simply no need for each individual to know all the specifics about the shortage, but merely knowing that tin costs more will prompt changes within each business. The problem with centralized economic planning is that it is impossible to have all the information needed at any one time in order to make informed and wise choices. The market system automatically adjusts itself as individuals make the necessary adjustments in response to changes in supply and demand. As much as I understand it, Hayek's argument seems valid. But I also do not clearly understand what it would mean to have a completely centralized and planned economy as opposed to a market economy. Anyone with a better knowledge of political economy is welcome to enlighten me.

Global Justice Secondary Literature

Below are some selections from the global distributive justice literature. If any of you are thinking of writing your first 3-4 page papers on this topic, or of expanding your first papers to take up this topic in the longer second/final paper, you may find some of the following helpful. If you want more guidance on what would be specifically useful for you, email me and based on the kind of argument you are developing vis-a-vis Rawls, Mill, or another liberal I can make more precise selections.

Global Justice Literature

General Overviews Online
Blake, Michael. “International Justice” at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/international-justice/>.
Scheurman, William. 2006. “Globalization” at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/>.

Cosmopolitans
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Beitz, Charles. 2000. “Rawls’s Law of Peoples” in Ethics 110 (2000): 669-96.

Beitz, Charles. 1983. “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” Journal of Philosophy 80, October 1983.

Beitz, Charles. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University, 1999.

Buchanan, Allen. 2000. “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World” in Ethics 110 (2000): 697-721.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2004. “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?” in Habermas, Ciaran Cronin (ed. and trans.), The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order. Stanford: Stanford University, 1995.
Pogge, Thomas. 2005. “World Poverty and Human Rights” in Ethics and International Affairs 19/1 (2005): 1-8.

Pogge, Thomas. 1994. “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no. 3, Summer 1994.

Tan, Kok-Chor. 2004. Justice Without Borders. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.

Westphalians (Nationalists)
Blake, Michael. 2002. “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2002): 257-96.

Nagel, Thomas. 2005. “The Problem of Global Justice” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 113-47

Rawls, John. 1993. “The Law of Peoples” in Rawls, Collected Papers.

Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Belknap, 1999.

Risse, Matthias. 2005. “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 349-76.

Intermediates (Regionalism, Pluralism)
Bohman, James. 2005. “From Demos to Demoi: Democracy Across Borders” in Ratio Juris 18, no. 3, (2005): 293-314.

Bohman, James. 2007. Democracy Across Borders. Cambridge: MIT, 2007.

Cohen, Joshua and Sabel, Charles. 2006. “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006): 147-75.

Gould, Carol C.. 2004. Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.

Gould, Carol C.. 2006. “Self-Determination beyond Sovereignty: Relating Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy” in Journal of Social Philosophy 37, no.1, (2006): 44-60.

Weinstock, Daniel. 2006. “The Real World of (Global) Democracy” in Journal of Social Philosophy 37, no. 1, Spring 2006: 6-20.

Young, Iris Marion. 2002. Inclusion and Democracy, Final Chapter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Associativists
Hurka, Thomas.1997. “The Justification of National Partiality” in McKim and McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University, 1997.

Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Scheffler, Samuel. 1994. “Families, Nations, and Strangers” in Boundaries and Allegiances. Oxford: Oxford University, 2001. Also published by University of Kansas in The Lindley Lectures Series.

Scheffler, Samuel. 1997, "Relationships and Responsibilities" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209.

Waldron, Jeremy. 1993. “Special Ties and Natural Duties” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1, (1993).

Moralists/Developmentalists
Murphy, Liam. 1993. “The Demands of Beneficence” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 4, Fall, 1993.

O’Neill, Onora. 1975. “Lifeboat Earth” in Philosophy & Public Affairs volume 4 (1975): 273-92.
Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence and Moralitiy” in Philosophy & Public Affairs volume 1 (1972): 229-43.

More??
See <http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/files/global_justice_bibliography.doc>

Pogge, Justice, and Distribution

Pogge suggests that the problem of global poverty could be easily solved by a certain degree of redistribution. This claim seems to rely on an analogy to the operation of redistribution in what we might consider well-ordered societies. Here, borders are to a certain extent closed and population grows at a slow rate. This means that the amount of goods within the society exists relative to a somewhat static population. Contrastingly, on a global level, from a Malthusian point of view, population seems to exist on the margins of resource availability: For Malthus, redistribution would not help, because population would always exist on the margin of available resources.
At the same time, within well-0rdered societies, standards of living seem to exist relative to an ever-expanding and growing conception of what qualifies as a good life - this reflects Rousseau's conception of inequality. Given these two bounds - on the one hand, ever-growing resource dependence as wealth increases, and, on the other hand, increases in population relative to the amount of resources available as wealth decreases, to what extent is just redistribution possible on a global scale? To what extent is the structure of global inequality, which Pogge criticizes, a function of biological/demographic constraints, rather than a matter of moral choice? Is there a reason, as per Nagel, that the sovereign state limits our capacity for redistribution? To what extent would a restructuring of inequality change the dynamics of population growth? Finally, how does the entire issue of human wealth clash if we add the earth as a third party affected by not just resource distribution, but resource production?

Nagel and Sovereignty

“[T]he nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice, and it is one of the advantages of domestic political theory that nation-states actually exist” (PPA 113)

Nagel seems to show his hand with this quote. Especially in its practical aspects, I can’t help but agree with Nagel’s thesis that a global body with centralized powers would allow for a much more expedient implementation of global justice. However there are a few nagging doubts in the back of my head: Nagel’s reliance on Hobbesian theory may not suit his purposes, for while it is Hobbes’ conviction that life before the nation-state was “nasty, brutish and short”, this is not necessarily supported by the archeological/anthropological evidence and it might be argued that the thousands of years of existence of hunter/gatherer tribes before the nation-state arises suggests that humans, while not “benevolent” creatures in the moral sense, might have a capacity for helping one another beyond theories of justice or legality. This would then suggest that a sovereign global political entity might not be an absolute necessity in perpetuating global justice, that we could possibly rely on a slow but steadily improving network of NGO’s, in conjunction with helpful government programs, to help out those in dire need. At least there seems to be a possibility (a possibility that seems to be already in the process of actualization), one that might be more palatable than a centrally sovereign global political body.

Nagel: The Problem of Global Justice

Nagel ends his piece with: "the path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice," (pg 147). He says that strong suprantional institutions will at first not aim at justice but pursue common interests; after these institutions are stabilized and recognized, they can be revised to pursue justice. I feel like this is Nagel's expanded version of Rawls' notions of overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium. If so, could we then attempt to apply Rawls' (domestic) difference principle globally?

Finding Secondary Articles on Mill and Rawls

A good resource for locating secondary articles in philosophy is "The Philosopher's Index" which UCSC library has a subscription to. You can access it from here:

http://library.ucsc.edu:8080/Zope//eresources/bytool/ArticleDatabases/#P

The "Sage Full-Text Political Science" collection is also useful and you can find it in the same place.

Go into the databases and search for terms like "Rawls, Basic Structure" or "Mill, Harm Principle" etc.. You may need to do more refined searches for very specific topics to get articles that are of value to you.

If anyone has questions about articles or book chapters they have found do not hesitate to email me.

Also I should mention that if you want to share 1 or 2 of your articles with each other that is fine, just so long as it is clear that you have each individually read the articles and provided your own summary abstract of the article. Hopefully you and a friend will not each turn in abstracts for the same three articles but sharing 1 or 2 amongst each other is just fine.

Rawls limited Principles of Justice

Rawls advocates that the potential principles of justice are put into a list and distributed to the people in the original position. Included on the list are the "more important conceptions of political justice found in our tradition of political philosophy" along with alternative principles of justice. The people in the original position all have to agree upon one alternative on this list. For Rawls, the original position serves as a 'selection device' and in the people in the original position would still end up with his two principles of justice. I feel that they do not encompass all possible forms of justice and that there should be more than just two principles. I am curious to know if other people are 1. in agreement with Rawls or i 2. f you have any suggestions for additional principles of justice?

Does the Original Position have any meaning in the real world?

I have some questions concerning Rawl’s Original Position. The OP is a thought experiment, not a real conference that ever actually took place. Rawls wants to use the OP to help illustrate how we ought to work together to establish social agreements. Given that, how is such an idealized hypothetical useful is helping us deal with real-world (in Rawlian terms, practical political-philosophical) concerns? Historically, the times where social agreements are made or changed tend to be marked with conflict and highlighted “social positions” rather than anything approaching a veil of ignorance or an aim of fair agreement. So, to respond to dlaz, can a period of conflict, like the Constitutional Convention in revolutionary America, even begin to approach the OP? The Constitutional Convention certainly did a better job than most colonial approaches to new social agreements, but what about the three-fifths rule? The electoral college?

Veil of Ignorance

Broadly speaking, the purpose of the Veil of Ignorance (VI) is the determination of the just/unjust through means of a "thought experiment". It is a "device of representation" (pp. 85) which seeks to extricate "special psychologies" (e.g. envy, spite, aversion to risk or uncertainty) from the perspective of parties. Rawls explains, "however rational it might be for the parties to favor principles framed to promote the determinate and known interests of those they represent, should they have the opportunity, the constraints of right, joined with the limits on information make that impossible" (pp. 86) Further, Rawls also argues under the publicity condition, "that parties in the O.P. are to take into account the consequences, social and psychological, of public recognition by citizens that these principles are mutually acknowledged and that they effectively regulate the basic structure" (pp. 86) How is it impossible to operate on "special psychologies" if parties are to consider the consequences of the publicity condition (e.g. parties accounting for the public recognition of principles)? by what process does the publicity condition work, how does it account for public recognition? it seems that there are two versions of rationality developing, that of only an individual (unlimited rationality) versus that of a member of a party (limited by VI) or in the most complicated case, both. Is it Rawls position that the same individual may operate under both forms of rationality?

Note on Two Assignments

One-Page Response due Tuesday April 22

(Note: no class meeting this Thursday April 17)

Content: Please turn in a one-page response paper concerning the public/private distinction as it arises in either Mill’s On Liberty or in Rawls’s Justice as Fairness. Describe the distinction as it figures in one of these texts and then very briefly describe or develop an argument for or against the distinction. Raise a problem—show why it’s good—describe what work it does—or what work it couldn’t do.

Format: I need one page double-spaced. If you want to type more then type up to one page single-spaced, but not longer. Include your name, email, and Student ID.

Clue: In Mill, look to the Harm Principle and to the Other-Regarding/Self-Regarding distinction. In Rawls, look to the idea of the basic structure and the idea of public reason (or public justification) as exemplifying a public sphere separate from the private sphere.

First Writing Assignment due Thursday May 1

Due on Thursday May 1 at the beginning of class and also via email (as Word DOC, PDF, or equivalent) to me at cwkoopman@gmail.com.

This should be a 3-4 page double-space argumentative essay on some topic in the Mill or Rawls reading. You can either defend an aspect of Millian liberalism or Rawlsian liberalism (or both). Or you can argue against either of these liberalisms (or both). An argumentative paper should lay out the view which is under consideration and then focus on advantages or disadvantages of that view. Whether you argue for or against you should definitely raise counter-objections to your thesis that will occur to your reader and respond to these (e.g., if you are attacking Mill, anticipate the Millian reply to your argument, and offer a counter-argument against the potential line of reply).

The best essays will draw on quotations from the Mill or Rawls reading, but do not quote them too extensively. Describe the idea in your words. Do not quote from the lectures but of course feel free to draw on ideas we went over in lecture (but turn the ideas into your own by offering them in your words). The very best essays will in addition draw on secondary literature but this is by no means a requirement and some ‘A’ papers will probably not make use of secondary literature in their paper.

In addition, there should be an extra page or two with an annotated bibliography of secondary materials that you research at the library or online. You must cover three secondary readings: articles in journals, chapters in books, or entire books. Offer full citations of the reading and a short (one paragraph) abstract or concise description of the reading, in your own words. The three secondary articles/chapters/books need to be relevant to the topic of your essay, of course.

If you are having trouble formulating a topic, then please email me or come see me in my office hour.

Taking Rawl's Two Principles of Justice to be worthwhile aims for society, I am curious about their potential and limitation within the confines of the nation-state and capitalism in the age of globalization. I see both the nation-state and capitalism as being completely contradictory to the aims of maximum equal liberty of persons and subsequently fair equality of opportunity and benifit of the least advantages. 1) As a fundamental tenant of the nation state is a stronghold on and competition over wealth and territory, is it possible for a nation state to really give maximize the equal liberty of persons when it must ignore the rights of people in other nations to acheive these ends? 2) As capitalism is a system that relies on there always being economic inequality between persons, can capitalism ever actually promote equal liberty of persons without heralding its own undoing?

Principles of Justice

To contribute, somewhat to the previous post, Rawls also states that within this original position there are two principles of justice. (part II sec.13). He says that in order to apply the second principle the first principle must be present as well as satisfied. Part two of the second principle says that the social and economic inequalities within a society must be "to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members" (43) Do you think it is possible for the inequalities to be to their "greatest benefit"? Doesn't the term inequality imply that it cannot really benefit anyone and if so then does it mean that if we apply the original position to the U.S government that it could potentially account for corruption and/or imbalances? (as mentioned in the previous post).

Rawl's Original Position

In Rawls's Justice as Fairness, Rawls speaks about the idea of the original position. The original position is a hypothetical situation or thought experiment. Basically, rational individuals are to set up a society in which they are ignorant to their social/economic/religious etc... affairs(veil of ignorance). These rational individuals are seeking their own happiness within the constraints of the basic structure of society. Rawls's purpose of this thought experiment is to see which rules would be key in structuring an equal society. The original position also "generalizes the idea of social contracts"(Rawls, 16). The united states government(**ideally**) could reflect the type of society that Rawls is ideal zing. Agree?? Disagree?? Could corruption and imbalances that the United States government has experienced be evidence that Rawls's idea of the original position is not realistic?? Is the United States Constitution a social contract that Rawls would approove of???

Wrongs Without Harms

This is a very difficult concept to find suitable objections to; the idea of wrongs without harms. One could argue that it may not harm anyone to, as in the example used in class, use someone's bed while they're away and without their knowledge or consent. It would seem that as long as no one found out, no harm is wrought. But what about using someone's body, as in nonconsensual sexual relations with an unconscious person? There are plenty of people that would think there was no harm done, since the would-be victim would remember nothing and so could not feel violated. What do you think of that idea? Doesn't it seem harmful regardless?

Julie Lange

History of Privacy Law lecture online

Notes from the first part of tonight's lecture (the material covering the History of U.S. Privacy Law and the Warren/Brandeis piece) are online here:
http://cwkoopman.googlepages.com/Teaching_Phil144_History_Privacy_Law.pdf

The Right To Privacy vs. The Right To Gossip

Warren and Brandeis argue that the protection of privacy is the default until such a reason arises warranting an invasion of this privacy. They characterize vaguely the circumstances whereupon the public may invade the privacy of the few such that the concern must be of the many, and not of few. Matters are private when one has "...not assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate matters of public investigation." He earlier differentiates between publishing the woeful qualities of a retiree versus those of a political candidate as only acceptable in the latter case. In general then they create an exception for cases that serve the interest of the public at large; my question is how large?
It is acceptable to publish everywhere the incredible lack of brains our president wields, and yet if you send out emails to everyone denouncing and warning of a particularly horrid teacher on campus I have no doubt UCSC would move swiftly to expel you on grounds of libel and character unbecoming of a student or something. But don't we all deserve to know about poor educators in order to avoid them? If we are allowed to gossip about the character of a potential political representative, how is that different from the right to know if someone you're interested in is a cheater or has stds or whatever? If you can reason that particular gossip can protect you from potential harm don't you have a right to hear it?

Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy"

It seems, that if there is no distinct evidence of harm, as defined by the law, then there is no wrong or rather, no act to criminalize. Professor Koopman gave the example of sleeping in someone's bed without their knowledge or consent. Where does the Patriot Act fit into the regulation of society versus the individual's right to privacy/life/happiness? In the Warren and Brandeis reading where does the right to privacy protect the individual against the Patriot Act while, at the same time, create a loophole for the Patriot Act to exist? (look to number two at the end of the paper) How is the title "right to privacy" justified, if this contradiction meant to create societal controls and protections can be so easily abused? Can one contend that the relationship between society and the individual (i.e. the individual’s responsibilities to society and the responsibility of society to the preservation of the individual’s rights) although, created under the merit of encouraging balance to ensure justice, has been unfairly weighted toward the benefit of society or rather the ruling governing system? Is the law more heavily weighted towards the ends that feed societal controls rather then the individual's right to privacy? Is this wrong? Is this right? To what end?

Warren and Brandeis offer the idea that protection is only offered when the subject-matter has the "attributes of ordinary tangible property."

First off, what do you make of this?

Secondly, is it possible (and to what extent), if the right to privacy was extended to clearly include protection of spirtual and intellectual property, that triviality in society's general dealings would result? If so, do you feel that would "destroy at once rebustness of thought and delicacy of feeling" as Warren and Brandeis suggested. And are the latter essential to maintain a functional democracy?

The Right to Privacy

In "the Right to Privacy," Warren and Brandeis state that, "The general object in view is to protect the privacy of private life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication under consideration has been made, to that extent the protection is likely to be withdrawn."

The question I am posing is simply, what must a man (or woman) do to ensure their lives (conversations, properties, etc.) are "private?" Where does the line get drawn from public to private? Of course, talking on a phone in your bedroom constitutes "private"- but what about someone talking on the phone in their car, with the window down, parked next to another car, and they are discussing a serious crime they had just committed or are to commit shortly?

Views on Privacy Through Warren and Brandeis

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argue in their article, "The Right to Privacy," that laws that were current in the 1890's helped individuals protect their privacy and tried to define what protection was and how it worked. They also looked into the invasion of privacy in relation to a person's private life.

Adding on to this, how might Warren's and Brandeis' views on privacy be used today through means of technology, such as the internet?

Society is purely abstract

This is my rough-draft thesis on Mill IV. You can read it or skip it. I put the questions at the bottom. -DLS

Laws are not created for “the good of society.” Laws are not intrinsic to society. Society comes first, laws come after; they are created to manage society. People huddle together for some purpose. This is the most basic social structure. Next, people organize themselves somehow. In doing so they delegate power (make laws). Laws are drawn up when a society seeks some kind of organization. Perhaps this organization is manifested fear: people have a need for protection. People feel vulnerable for all kinds of reasons. However, protection is not the only reason why a society has/wants laws. People have emotional needs. Laws are created with a specific purpose: to address the emotional needs of people. They represent all kinds of sentiments. Laws are nothing more than issues of emotionality [and morality] (93). Society is not concerned with emotionality. Society is a metaphysical construction that describes a space in which people exist/act in proximity to each other. Society is an invisible phenomenon. It only exists conceptually; it has no thoughts or feelings. Society is indifferent to the emotional needs of the agents that produce its existence. There is no “good” or “bad” side to society since it is an emotionless/abstract construction. Laws cannot be created for the benefit of society in any way. Laws are created for another purpose.

What purpose does law serve?
Does it serve a society?
How can you justify that society exists?