Two Questions

1. Young seems to be aiming for a society of difference without hierarchy, in as much as hierarchy would entail difference as being a basis for exclusion. Are all kinds of difference amenable to this system? Are there certain kinds of difference that we might want to a priori exclude from the liberal state? How might a just politics of difference pragmatically relate to things like religious fundamentalism (Islamic or Christian), or issues given strong moral weight as regards life like abortion or animal rights. What is the extent of liberal toleration?

2. Does Young's critique, by focusing on an emancipatory interest juxtaposed against an oppressive one, recapitulate sovereign power? Does conceiving of power relations as disciplinary power simply entail an acknowledgment that the exercise of power is diffuse and no longer connected to a unary, directly blamable body, so that emancipation must take on structures and relations rather than individuals, or might Young need to better account for the productive and complicit ways in which we partake in disciplinary power?